How easy is it to steal any electronically tabulated election?
Just got an email from my friend, Josh, who’s been working for the past year or so with Bruce Schneier and others at the NYU Brennan Center for Justice and the National Institute of Standards and Technology to analyze electronic voting system security.
Bruce has a lot of important stuff to say on his blog about this topic. I encourage all to go read it, now. Here’s the full-text if you have the time, or at least give the Executive Summary a look-see.
Discussion highlights, for me, include:
- Preston Bannister in the comments of Bruce’s Blog: “With current voting systems, a single person in the wrong place could change votes and swing an election. We cannot be certain that past elections have not been corrupted. We can do better.”
- Brett in the comments of Bruce’s Blog: “I guess until we have an election demonstrably stolen by these devices, we are stuck with them…” and
- Longwalker in the comments of Bruce’s Blog: “There is already very clear evidence of massive fraud in electronic vote counting. Exit poll results in both 2000 and 2004 are significantly different than official election results. The difference is highly pronounced in key states such as Flordia and Ohio. This is as close to a smoking gun as one can get with non-auditable DREs. See http://center.grad.upenn.edu/center/get.cgi?item=exitpollp“